Research

Work in progress

Political Violence and the Persistence of Memory

with Lorenzo Catalano

NATO culture: Political and cultural effects of U.S. military presence

with Abel François and Pierre-Guillaume Méon

US Go Home! Economic impact of foreign military bases

with Abel François · Draft available on request

Abstract

This paper examines the local economic impacts of NATO base closures in France following President Charles de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command. A panel of 34,473 municipalities allows us to track them over time to evaluate the causal impact of base closures. Using a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching, we exploit spatial variation in base closures to estimate their effect on population growth in affected municipalities. Our results indicate that cities within 35 km of a base experienced a 0.2 percentage point decrease in annual population growth for up to 30 years post-closure, suggesting negative demand shocks can have persistent effects on local economies that go beyond the adjustment of housing prices.

Departure of US troops from France, 1967
Departure of US troops from France, 1967. Source: © Getty Images.

Other projects

Does strategic voting payoff? Evidence from the US Senate, 1911-2013

Abstract

It is often assumed that politicians strategically adjust their policy stances to further their political careers, but little is known of the effectiveness of such strategies. In the U.S. Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order, which induces patterns of strategic voting. This paper exploits the quasi-experimental setting of the US Senate to estimate the impact of strategic voting on the election outcomes of incumbent senators. Using an instrumental variable strategy where the probability of senators deviating from the party line on roll call votes is instrumented by their relative position in the alphabetical order, this paper examines whether strategic deviations impact the probability of re-election of incumbent senators. The results indicate that on average, strategic deviations have a large negative effect on senators' chances of re-election. These effects are however predominantly driven by minority party senators, who put their party at greater risk when deviating. Conversely, majority party senators increased their re-election probability through strategic deviations. Adjusting for selection into candidacy, I document a positive effect of strategically deviating on re-election unconditional on running.